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THE IMPLICATIONS OF KELO IN LAND USE LAW
Daniel J. Curtin, Jr.*
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of
New London provoked considerable backlash from media
editorials and politicians alike decrying a radical expansion of
government power to take private property. This article
argues that, despite the alarmist tenor of the reaction, the
Court's decision in Kelo was not a departure from precedent,
or otherwise surprising. Instead, Kelo upheld the long-
accepted principle that the taking of property for the purpose
of economic development, even when it involves transferring
the property to a private party, satisfies the Fifth
Amendment's "public use" requirement. Kelo is notable in its
reliance on, and deferral to, the City of New London's finding
that eminent domain would serve a public purpose based on
the City's comprehensive planning effort and economic
development plan for revitalization. This article cautions
that over-reaction and misinterpretation of Kelo may have
the negative consequence of removing what has been a useful
tool to facilitate redevelopment.
I. THE GENESIS AND EVOLUTION OF INDIVIDUAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AS THEY APPLY TO A GOVERNMENT'S
EMINENT DOMAIN POWER
The power to take property for public use has existed
since the early days of Roman Law.' However, it was not
until the middle ages that the taking of property was first
discussed as a "distinct branch of government power."2 As
* I would like to express my thanks to Brian P. Mulry, J.D., M.S.E.L,, Bryan W.
Wenter, J.D., M.R.P., and Todd A. Williams, J.D., Bingham McCutchen LLP,
Counsel, for assisting me in preparing this article.
1. 1 JULIUS SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.12, at 1-14 (3d
ed. 2005).
2. Id.
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civilization progressed, philosophers began to ponder the
nature of individual rights as opposed to broad governmental
power.' In 1625, Hugo Grotius, who wrote of such power in
his work De Jure Belli et Paci, birthed the term "dominium
eminens" (eminent domain).4 Grotius noted that there was
an inherent governmental power of eminent domain not only
in times of government necessity, but also simply for "public
utility, to which ends those who founded civil society must be
supposed to have intended that private ends should give
way."5  However, Grotius also observed a restriction on
government power that has come to form the basis of modern
takings claims: "the state is bound to make good the loss to
those who lose their property."6
Grotius's noted restriction on government power was not
wholly revolutionary. Section 39 of the Magna Carta
mandated that "[n]o freemen shall be taken or imprisoned or
diseased or exiled or in any way destroyed, nor will we go
upon him nor send upon him, except by the lawful judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land."7 Grotius's qualification
also complimented similar sentiments by other philosophers
and legal scholars of roughly the same time period who
recognized similar limitations on the King's power. Sir
Edward Coke, Lord Chief Justice of England, often asserted
in his works that "the common law was a long-recognized
tradition of rights" to which even the King must pay homage
and obedience.8 Similarly, Sir William Blackstone "stressed
the continuity of the common law, as well as its position as a
bulwark against the royal powers."9  John Locke also
advocated for limitations to the King's rule by advancing the
notion of "natural rights," namely property rights that were
not subject to royal authority.1
This concern for protecting individual rights, in light of
3. Id.
4. Id. at 1-15.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Edward J. Sullivan, A Brief History of the Takings Clause, Paper
presented at "Celebrating 70 Years! IMLA Annual Conference, Savannah, GA,"
From Challenges to Opportunities: Local Government Law in Georgia's First
City (Sept. 2005) (on file with author).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2.
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the auspices of a strong central government, also preoccupied
the original drafters of the United States Constitution.
Among the Anti-Federalists, Thomas Jefferson advocated for
the incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Constitution.1'
Specifically, the Fifth Amendment states: "Nor [shall any
person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation." 2 However, the restrictions
on government power within the Bill of Rights originally only
applied to the federal government, not the state
governments. 13 It was not until after the Civil War and the
passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments that courts began to hold states accountable to
the mandates and restrictions of the Bill of Rights. 4
The controversy surrounding what constitutes a valid
public use for eminent domain did not become prevalent until
the demands for government support of commerce
increased. 5 In colonial and early America, eminent domain
was employed quite extensively for purposes including but
not limited to mills, private roads, and the drainage of private
lands. 6 There was little disagreement that these uses were
public and that eminent domain could be used in their
assistance. 17
Following ratification of the Pennsylvania and Vermont
state constitutions in 1776-77, other states sought in their
early constitutions to place public use limits upon the use of
eminent domain.'" The judiciaries in these states similarly
sought to define the limits of "public use" by offering various
interpretations about the meaning of the term. 9 Throughout
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, various
definitions described the "public use" limitation.2" Today the
phrase allows almost any type of property to be acquired so
11. Id.
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
13. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 2 (citing Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S.
243 (1833)).
14. Sullivan, supra note 7, at 2.
15. 2A SACKMAN, supra note 1, § 7.01, at 7-18.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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long as it serves a broadly defined public use.2'
Many local governments initiate urban renewal projects
to cure the economic stagnation or depression that many
urban areas face. In general, urban renewal projects seek to
clear unsafe and unsanitary blight by condemning an entire
area, even though some budildings within the designated area
may not be blighted.22 Many localities have expanded the
reach of urban renewal projects to urban areas that may be
economically depressed and in need of an economic
development plan for rejuvenation.23 Statutes authorizing
urban renewal projects of this character have been upheld,
despite significant criticism and possible abuses of this type
of land acquisition.24 The United States Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that the eminent domain power is
coterminous with the police power.25  Thus, prior to the
decision in Kelo v. City of New London, a city's eminent
domain power as well as a broad definition of public use were
both well established.
II. KELO V. CITY OF NEW LONDON: THE QUESTIONS FEW ARE
ASKING, AND THE ANSWERS VERY FEW ARE GIVING
A. What Was Really at Issue in Kelo?
In Kelo v. City of New London, the United States
Supreme Court, by a narrow 5-4 decision, upheld as
constitutional the condemnation of real property containing
non-blighted houses as part of a broader economic
development plan.2 6 The essential issue before the Court was
"whether the [Clity's decision to take property for the purpose
of economic development satisfies the 'public use'
requirement of the Fifth Amendment." 27 The Court held that
21. 2A SACKMAN, supra note 11, § 7.01, at 7-18.
22. Id. § 7.06, at 7-173.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Timothy J. Dowling, Give Eminent Domain a Chance: Law Supports
City's Redevelopment, S.F. DAILY J., Feb. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.dailyjournal.com/law/index.cfm; see also Brown v. Wash. Legal
Found., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp.,
503 U.S. 407 (1992); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
26. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005).
27. Id. at 2661.
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the condemnation served a public purpose because of the
anticipated economic benefits of the proposed project, even
though the public did not have direct access to the property
and a private developer was to select tenants for the
property.28 Reaffirming settled law, the Court also noted that
a city cannot exercise its eminent domain powers with the
"mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual purpose
was to bestow a private benefit."2 9
At the same time, the "Court long ago rejected any literal
requirement that condemned property be put into use for the
general public."3 Indeed, while many state courts in the
mid-nineteenth century endorsed "use by the public" as the
proper definition of public use, that narrow view steadily
eroded over time.3 1 According to the Kelo court:
Not only was the "use by the public" test difficult to
administer (e.g., what proportion of the public need have
access to the property? at what price?), but it proved to be
impractical given the diverse and always evolving needs of
society. Accordingly, when the Court began applying the
Fifth Amendment to the states at the close of the
nineteenth century, it embraced the broader and more
natural interpretation of public use as "public purpose."
32
The Kelo Court characterized the City's eminent domain
takings as a public use because the City executed its eminent
domain power "pursuant to a carefully considered" economic
development plan drafted by a publicly appointed, nonprofit
developer.3 3 The Court recognized this was not a case in
which the City was planning to open the condemned land-at
least not in its entirety-to use by the general public. Nor
were the private lessees of the land in any sense "required to
operate like common carriers, making their services available
to all comers."34
B. What is All the Kelo Uproar About?
Unfortunately, several media accounts of the case have
28. Id. at 2655.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 2662 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244).
31. Id.
32. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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omitted some of the facts that are essential to understanding
the Supreme Court's decision. Many news accounts of, and
editorials regarding, the Kelo decision mischaracterize it as
an assault on private property rights." There is little
mention of the planning that had been in progress since the
City enlisted New London Development Corporation (NLDC)
in 1978 to form a comprehensive economic development plan
to revitalize the City. 6 There was little, if any, discussion of
the fact that the Court essentially reaffirmed relevant
precedent from earlier decisions such as Berman v. Parker
and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff-cases that upheld
government supported projects based on the broad definition
of "public use" and the similarly broad reach of the police
power.3 7  Some of the news articles failed even to mention
that the Supreme Court was reluctant to substitute its
judgment for that of the local government.
C. The City's Economic Development
New London is situated where the Thames River meets
Long Island Sound in southeastern Connecticut.3 Within the
City's six square miles, the population has dwindled to 1920s
levels. The local unemployment rate is double that of the
state. 9 While highly dependent on the real property tax for
local revenue, fifty-four percent of the property in the City is
tax-exempt because it is owned by the federal or state
government, or a nontaxpaying entity.40
Decades of economic decline led a state agency in 1990 to
designate the City a "distressed municipality."4 Many jobs
were lost through the departure and downsizing of
businesses, the largest of which was the Naval Undersea
35. See, e.g., Editorial, A Win for Big Government, WASH. TIMES, June 24,
2005, available at
http://www.washingtontimes.com/functions/print.php?StorylD=20050623-
084200-4178r; Editorial, Kennedy's Vast Domain: The Supreme Court's Reverse
Robin Hoods, WALL ST. J., June 24, 2005, available at
http'//www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110006862.
36. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
37. Id.; see also Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman
v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33-36 (1954).
38. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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Warfare Center, which shut down during a round of base
realignments and closures.42 The center previously employed
over 1,500 people in the Fort Trumbull area of the City.43
Such conditions prompted state and local officials to
target New London for economic revitalization. 4 To that end,
NLDC, a private nonprofit entity established some years
earlier to assist the City in planning economic development,
was directed to draft a development plan for the Fort
Trumbull area.45 In January 1998, the state authorized a
$5.35 million bond issue to support NLDC's planning
activities and a $10 million bond issue toward the creation of
Fort Trumbull State Park.46
In February 1998, Pfizer Inc., a large pharmaceutical
company, announced that it would build a $300 million
research facility on a site adjacent to Fort Trumbull.47 Local
planners and officials expected Pfizer to be the catalyst for
the area's economic rejuvenation.4" After receiving initial
approval from the City Council, NLDC continued drafting its
economic development plan and held a series of neighborhood
meetings to educate the public about the process and seek
feedback. 49 The City Council authorized NLDC to formally
submit its plans to the relevant state agencies for review.50
Upon obtaining state-level approval, NLDC finalized an
economic development plan for the ninety-acre Fort Trumbull
area.51 The City Council approved the plan in January 2000
and designated the NLDC as its development agent in charge
of implementation. 5 2
D. The Contents of the Economic Development Plan
It is important to understand that the economic
development plan did not consist of purely private
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658.
45. Id. at 2658-59.
46. Id. at 2659.
47. Id. at 2659.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2659.
51. Id.
52. Id.
20061 793
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development.53 The plan represented a comprehensive mix of
uses that would ensure economic diversity and an overall
public benefit.54  The development planning area was
segmented into seven parcels. Parcel 1 was designated for a
waterfront conference hotel at the center of a "small urban
village" that would include restaurants and shopping." This
parcel would also have marinas for both recreational and
commercial uses.56 A pedestrian "riverwalk" would originate
here and continue down the coast, connecting the waterfront
areas of the development.57 Parcel 2 would be the site of
approximately eighty new residences organized into an urban
neighborhood and linked by public walkway to the remainder
of the development, including the state park."8 This parcel
also included space reserved for a new U.S. Coast Guard
Museum.59 Parcel 3, which was located immediately north of
the Pfizer facility, would contain at least 90,000 square feet of
research and development office space.6 0 Parcel 4A was a 2.4-
acre site that would be used either to support the adjacent
state park, by providing parking or retail services for visitors,
or to support the nearby marina. 1 Parcel 4B would include a
renovated marina as well as the final stretch of the
riverwalk.62 Parcels 5, 6, and 7 would provide land for office
and retail space, parking, and water-dependant commercial
uses. 
63
NLDC intended for the development plan to capitalize on
the arrival of the Pfizer facility and any spillover benefits it
was expected to generate.' In addition to creating jobs,
generating tax revenue, and helping to "build momentum for
the revitalization of downtown New London," the plan was
also designed to make the City more attractive and to create
leisure and recreational opportunities on the waterfront and
53. Id.
54. See id. at 2665.
55. Id. at 2659.
56. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
63. Id.
64. Id.
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in the park.65 Vested with the City's authorization, NLDC
successfully negotiated the purchase of most of the land in
the ninety-acre area, but its negotiations with a small group
of landowners failed.66 As a result, in November 2000, NLDC
initiated the condemnation proceedings that gave rise to the
Kelo case.
E. The Hold-Out Property Owners
Nine property owners refused to relinquish their
property to the City in exchange for just compensation. 8
Altogether, the property owners owned fifteen properties in
Fort Trumbull-four in parcel 3 of the economic development
plan and eleven in parcel 4A.69  Ten of the parcels were
occupied by the owner or a family member, the other five
were held as investment properties. 0 Susette Kelo lived in
the Fort Trumbull area since 1997, and made extensive
improvements to her home, which she prized for its water
view.7' Wilhemina Dery was born in her Fort Trumbull
house in 1918 and had lived there her entire life. 72  Her
husband Charles had lived in the house since they married
some sixty years ago.73 They occupied the same house that
Ms. Dery's parents first occupied when they moved to the
area over 100 years ago. 4 There is no doubt that the
property owners had legitimate reasons for refusing to
relinquish their property, despite the fact that the power of
eminent domain is essentially an inherent governmental
power intended to accomplish land transfers in the face of
holdouts .
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2660.
67. Id.
68. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 2660.
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III. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF KELO V. CITY OF NEW
LONDON: REAFFIRMING AGE-OLD SUPREME COURT
PRECEDENT
A. The "Public Use" Requirement is Coterminous with the
Scope of the Police Power
The legal basis for all land use regulation is the police
power, which allows a city76 to protect the public health,
safety, and welfare of its residents." A city's land use
decisions lie within the police power if they reasonably relate
to the public welfare. v8
With regard to public use, as Justice William 0. Douglas,
speaking for the Supreme Court, stated:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and
inclusive .... The values it represents are spiritual as
well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is
within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as
carefully patrolled.79
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court upheld a village's
zoning ordinance relating to land use restrictions on single-
family dwelling units in Village of Belle Terre v. Boras. ° This
opinion, written by Justice Douglas, identified the interests
that supported the village's exercise of its police power at the
time:
A quiet place where yards are wide, people few, and motor
vehicles restricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use
project addressed to family needs. This goal is a
permissible one within Berman v. Parker .... The police
power is not confined to elimination of filth, stench, and
unhealthy places. It is ample to lay out zones where
family values, youth values, and the blessings of quiet
seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary for
76. When the word "city" is used, it also means "county."
77. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
78. See Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 18 Cal. 3d 582,
604 (1976).
79. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (internal citations omitted).
80. Village of Belle Terre v. Boras, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
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people."1
Today, regulations are sustained under complex
conditions that at one time may have been condemned as
arbitrary and unreasonable. 2 Cities face different needs and
interests than those identified in Village of Belle Terre, and
courts afford greater deference to legislative determinations
wherein a city, under its police power authority, exercises
eminent domain.3 Cities are confronted with "smart
growth," "sustainable growth," "new urbanism," and other
techniques to stop sprawl. In addition, they are at times
confronted with stagnant local economies. Through
legislative processes, cities may condemn land for
redevelopment pursuant to thoughtful and deliberate
economic development plans. Local regulations addressing
such concepts are as proper an exercise of a city's police
power as were those in Village of Belle Terre, due to the
elasticity of that power.
In Kelo, the United States Supreme Court acknowledged
and cited settled case law upholding the broad reach of the
police power and, likewise, an expansive reading of the public
use requirement. In addition to its Berman decision, which
broadly construed the police power and the scope of "public
use," the Court relied on its more recent decision in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkiff."4  In Midkiff, the Court
considered a Hawaii statute whereby fee title was taken from
lessors and transferred to lessees, for just compensation, in
order to break up a land oligopoly. 5 Justice O'Connor,
writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that "the State's
purpose of eliminating 'the social and economic evils of land
oligopoly' qualified as a valid public use." 6 The Court
reasoned that "[t]he 'public use' requirement is thus
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers."7
In the same term, the Supreme Court continued to afford
great deference to legislative determinations for public use
81. Id. at 9.
82. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
83. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2663 (2005).
84. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
85. Id.
86. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229).
87. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
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and public health, safety, and welfare. 88
B. The Kelo Majority: Following Precedent and Deferring to
Legislative Decisions
The five Justices in the Kelo majority underscored
longstanding Supreme Court precedent under which the
Court avoids interfering with local legislative decisions.8 9
Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens stated, "For more
than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely
eschewed rigid formulas and intrusive scrutiny in favor of
affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what
public needs justify the use of the takings power."90 The
Court rejected the landowners' argument for a bright-line
rule prohibiting the use of the power of eminent domain for
economic development, noting that facilitating economic
development is an important traditional governmental
function.91  The Court held that there was no logical
distinction between public use for economic development and
other uses declared to be legitimate public uses.92
As the submissions of the parties and their amici make
clear, the necessity and wisdom of using eminent domain
to promote economic development are certainly matters of
legitimate public debate. This Court's authority, however,
extends only to determining whether the City's proposed
condemnations are for a "public use" within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
Because over a century of our case law interpreting that
provision dictates an affirmative answer to that question,
we may not grant petitioners relief that they seek.93
88. In Ruckeleshaus v. Monsanto, the Court upheld certain provisions of the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) that authorized
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to "consider the date (including
trade secrets) submitted by a prior pesticide applicant in evaluating a
subsequent application, so long as the second applicant provided just
compensation for the data." Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240 (citing Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)). The Court ultimately held that Congress
had sufficient belief "that sparing applicants the cost of time-consuming
research eliminated a significant barrier to entry in the pesticide market and
thereby enhanced competition." Id. (citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1015).
89. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663, 2665.
90. Id. at 2664.
91. Id. at 2665-67.
92. Id. at 2662.
93. Id. at 2668.
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After the Court ruled that determinations of use for
economic development were typically legislative, as opposed
to judicial, decisions, it applied the broad deference it has
traditionally afforded legislatures when faced with matters of
socioeconomic concern.94
The Kelo Court rejected the landowners' argument that
such a taking must show that there is a "reasonable
certainty" that the public will actually receive the expected
public benefit.9 In doing so, the Court acknowledged the long
line of cases in which a deferential standard of review was
applied to legislative decisions. 96 According to the Court,
"[wihen the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means
are not irrational, our cases make clear that empirical
debates over the wisdom of takings-no less than debates
over the wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation-
are not to be carried out in the federal courts."97 Therefore,
the Supreme Court followed its well-established precedent of
deferring to legislative decisions by declining to adopt the
"reasonable certainty" requirement.98
With regard to its consideration of public benefits, the
Kelo majority cited its recent decision in Lingle v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., in which the Court struck down the
"substantially advances" test for regulatory takings because
it would inappropriately "empower-and might often
require-courts to substitute their predictive judgments for
those of elected legislatures and expert agencies."99 In Lingle,
the Hawaii Legislature, concerned about the effects of market
concentration on the retail price of gasoline, passed Act 257 to
limit the rent oil companies could charge lessee-dealers. 100
Under the rent cap of the state statute, oil companies could
not charge lessee-dealers more than fifteen percent of the
dealer's gross profits from gasoline sales plus fifteen percent
of gross sales of products other than gasoline.' Chevron
94. See id. at 2667 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242
(1984)).
95. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667.
96. Id. at 2667-68.
97. Id. at 2667 (citing Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 229).
98. See id. at 2667-68.
99. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005); Kelo, 125 S. Ct.
at 2668.
100. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 533.
101. Id.
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challenged the rent cap on its face, arguing that it did not
"substantially advance" a legitimate government interest. 10 2
The federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals sided with Chevron, ruling that the statute would
not "substantially advance" the stated interest because it
would not actually reduce lessee-dealers' costs or retail
prices. 10
3
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed,
holding that the "substantially advances" inquiry is one of
due process, that it has no place in takings jurisprudence,
and that the language was "regrettably imprecise."'0 4  In
other words, the means-ends nature of the inquiry addresses
due process considerations, but has nothing to do with
whether private property has been taken under the
Constitution. 10 5 The Court reasoned that a takings analysis
should not demand heightened review of legislative
determinations, "a task for which courts are not well
suited."10 6 Rather, the analysis should focus on "help[ing to]
identify those regulations whose effects are functionally
comparable to government appropriation or invasion of
private property."'0 7
Similarly, the majority in Kelo recognized that it should
apply a deferential standard to the legislature's
determination of public use."0 8 The Court explicitly noted the
connection between the two cases: "[Elarlier this term we
explained why similar practical concerns (among others)
undermined the use of the "substantially advances' formula
in our regulatory takings doctrine."'19
C. The Importance of a Comprehensive Economic
Development Plan
Local governments can minimize the risks of judicial
challenges to their public use determinations by creating
102. Id. at 533-34.
103. Id. at 534-36.
104. Id. at 540-42.
105. Id. at 542.
106. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544.
107. Id. at 542.
108. See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005).
109. Id. at 2667 ("[Tlhis formula would empower-and might often require-
courts to substitute their predicative judgments for those of elected legislatures
and expert agencies.") (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 544).
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comprehensive economic development plans and/or
addressing such issues in their general plans, or as needed in
specific plans."' As noted above, the Court generally will not
closely scrutinize legislative decisions that are supported by
well-reasoned decision-making processes."1  The Court
affords broad deference to legislative decisions because the
remedy for poor legislative decisions is at the ballot box, not
in the courts. In Kelo, the majority underscored the fact that
the City's comprehensive economic development plan was
thorough and deliberate. 12
Consequently, the Kelo majority deferred to the City's
judgment of using eminent domain to redevelop the Fort
Trumbull area because the record indicated that the economic
development plan would serve a public purpose."' In other
words, the Court was able to discern from the record the
City's intent to put this land to public use." According to the
Court, "Itihe City has carefully formulated an economic
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable
benefits to the community, including-but by no means
limited to-new jobs and increased tax revenue. " "'
Furthermore, the majority noted the comprehensive
nature of the project and pointed out that such urban
planning and development is a legislative, not judicial,
matter: "As with other exercises in urban planning and
development, the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety
of commercial, residential, and recreational uses of land, with
the hope that they will form a whole greater than the sum of
its parts.""6  It is the "whole greater than the sum of its
parts" that the majority viewed as the "public use.""7
Therefore, the media's contention that Kelo affirmed a City's
110. See Edward J. Sullivan & Isa Lester, The Role of the Comprehensive
Plan in Infrastructure Financing, 37 URB. L. 53, 55 (2005). In California, the
general plan, a legislative act, is the constitution for all future development and
all such development, whether public or private, must be consistent with that
general plan. Associated Home Builders, Inc. v. City of Walnut Creek 4 Cal. 3d
641 (1971). For specific plans in California, see sections 65450-457 of the
California Government Code.
111. See supra Part III.B.
112. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
113. Id. at 2664-65.
114. Id. at 2665
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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right to condemn private property solely to transfer it to
another private party is misleading.
The City's comprehensive economic development plan
was essential to the Kelo majority's view that the plan would
serve a public purpose.'18  The landowners argued that
without a bright-line rule prohibiting eminent domain for
economic development, nothing would prevent the
government from seizing A's property to simply give it to B."9
However, the Court determined that "[sluch a one-to-one
transfer of property, executed outside the confines of an
integrated development plan, is not presented in this case."120
The Court made clear that "it has long been accepted that a
sovereign may not take the property of A for the sole purpose
of transferring it to another private party B, even though A is
paid just compensation."21  Despite the Court's efforts to
make clear that such condemnation is prohibited, the media
blitz thrust Kelo into the public spotlight by claiming that A
to B transfers are exactly what the Court authorized.
According to the Court,
[tihe City has carefully formulated an economic
development plan that it believes will provide appreciable
benefits to the community .... Given the comprehensive
character of the plan, the thorough deliberation that
preceded its adoption, and the limited scope of our review,
it is appropriate for us, as it was in Berman, to resolve the
challenges of the individual owners, not on a piecemeal
basis, but rather in light of the entire plan.122
Unfortunately, few popular accounts of the case
accurately reflected the Court's deliberate holding. The
Court's actual language failed to make the cutting room floor.
Noted land use attorney and author Dwight Merriam
expressed the same frustration in a recent article:
I read hundreds of e-mail messages and electronic reports
on Kelo in the days following the decision and it reminded
me of the children's game of Telephone .... The first child
is given a short statement such as: "The Court in Kelo has
followed its precedent and held given the facts that the
118. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665.
119. Id. at 2666.
120. Id. at 2667.
121. Id. at 2661.
122. Id. at 2665.
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needs of the community, the plan, and the degree of
government control were sufficient to support a legislative
finding that the land assembly and private economic
development was a public purpose and therefore a public
use under the Fifth Amendment." The next child
whispers to the next and so forth until it has gone all
around the circle from one end of the room to the other.
And the last child says: "The Court held in Kelo that
governments can take private property for any old private
developer at any time without regard for need,
government oversight, or any kind of plan."
123
Contrary to some media accounts, the decision stands for
the proposition that the Supreme Court is reluctant to
overturn a state or local legislature's land use decision for a
public purpose, as long as it is supported by a thorough,
deliberate and reasonable plan. Of course, that prospect is
not revolutionary.
D. Justice Kennedy's Concurring Opinion: Rational Basis
Doesn't Mean Free License
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion that sought
to clarify the extent of the Court's holding.'24 He observed
that the Court's deferential standard of review in such cases
was effectively akin to rational basis review for economic
regulations under the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution. 125 Such a standard of review,
according to Justice Kennedy, does not foreclose the
possibility that a more stringent standard of review would be
appropriate in cases where the challenged condemnation is
suspicious, the procedures used are prone to abuse, or the
stated benefits are trivial or implausible. 126 The concurrence
is a reminder that the Court retains the power to determine if
the economic development plan prompting eminent domain is
for an impermissible, nonpublic purpose.
123. Dwight H. Merriam, A Hat Trick in the U.S. Supreme Court for
Government: Lingle, San Remo, and Kelo, 28 ZONING AND PLAN. L. RPT. No. 8,
at 1 (Sept. 2005).
124. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669-71 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
126. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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E. Justice O'Connor's Dissent: Sounding the Alarm
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor sounded the alarm that
would contribute to the post-Kelo frenzy that has followed an
otherwise legally unremarkable case. 27 According to the
dissent,
[ulnder the banner of economic development, all private
property is now vulnerable to being taken and transferred
to another private owner, so long as it might be
upgraded-i.e., given to an owner who will use it in a way
that the legislature deems more beneficial to the public-
in the process. 128
The dissent remained unpersuaded by the majority's
reliance on the City's comprehensive economic development
plan.129 However, Justice O'Connor's impassioned dissent is
inconsistent with the approach she articulated in Lingle just
weeks earlier. 130  The Kelo dissent would not defer to
legislative decisions to determine whether an economic
development plan satisfies the "public use" requirement of
the Constitution.13 '
The dissenting Justices believed that conveying private
property to other private parties can never represent a
"public purpose" and therefore could not constitute a "public
use" under the Fifth Amendment. According to Justice
O'Connor,
[tio reason.., that the incidental public benefits resulting
from the subsequent ordinary use of private property
render economic development takings "for public use" is to
wash out any distinction between private and public use
of property-and thereby effectively to delete the words
"for public use" from the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. 132
Justice O'Connor argued that the Court should provide a
bright-line rule that all economic development, no matter its
127. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
128. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
130. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005); see also John R.
Nolon & Jessica A. Bacher, Confirming a Century of Case Law, N.Y.L.J.,
June 29, 2005, available at
http://www.pace.edu/LawSchool/landuse/gainingGroundNewsletter/October%20
2005/Kelo2.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2006).
131. See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677-78 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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character or public benefit, should not be held to represent a
valid "public use" for eminent domain purposes. 133 Instead of
deferring to legislative judgments of what land use may
constitute a public purpose and use, she argued for a rule
prohibiting the use of eminent domain for economic
development.13 1 In fact, Justice O'Connor unequivocally
questioned the constitutionality of economic development
takings and indicated that she would hold that such takings
are not constitutional. 3 5  She then stated that the Court
rightfully admitted, however, "that the judiciary cannot get
bogged down in predictive judgments about whether the
public will actually be better off after a property transfer."
136
In any event, she said that this constraint had no realistic
import:
For who among us can say she already makes the most
productive or attractive possible use of her property? The
specter of condemnation hangs over all property. Nothing
is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6 with a
Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm
with a factory. 137
Justice O'Connor went on to say that
[a] ny property may now be taken for the benefit of another
private party, but the fallout from this decision will not be
random. The beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens
with disproportionate influence and power in the political
process, including large corporations and development
firms. As for the victims, the government now has license
to transfer property from those with fewer resources to
those with more. The Founders cannot have intended this
perverse result.138
The dissenting justices placed little stock in the City's
economic development planning processes, which involved
extensive public input, substantial public benefits, and
approval under a unique state law. According to Justice
O'Connor,
[i]f legislative prognostications about the secondary public
133. Id. at 2680-81 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 2686 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
137. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
138. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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benefits of a new use can legitimate a taking, there is
nothing in the Court's rule or in Justice Kennedy's gloss
on that rule to prohibit property transfers generated with
less care, that are less comprehensive, that happen to
result from a less elaborate process, whose only projected
advantage is the incidence of higher taxes or that hope to
transform an already prosperous city into an even more
prosperous one.' 39
In selectively recognizing the actual facts, the dissent
overstated the decision's impact on private property rights.
While the Court will defer to legislative determinations of an
economic development plan's "public purpose," the Court will
examine the plan's record to ensure that the city's
determination is reasonable. While this standard of
deference does not represent a sufficiently definitive test for
the dissent, the Supreme Court has consistently deferred to
legislative decisions involving land use planning issues.
Despite this long-standing precedent, Justice O'Connor's
dissent has served as a rallying-cry for eminent domain
critics who viewed Kelo as radical departure of past takings
jurisprudence.
IV. THE "BACKLASH"-
FEDERAL AND STATE RESPONSES TO THE DECISION
A. Reactions to Kelo
Just seven days after the Court issued the Kelo opinion,
the U.S. House of Representatives passed a rare non-binding
resolution expressing "grave disapproval" with the Court's
decision. 4 ° House Resolution 340 (Gingrey, R-Ga.), which
had seventy-eight co-sponsors and passed on 365 to 33 vote,
asserted the House's agreement with Justice O'Connor's
dissenting opinion.14 ' The resolution stated that eminent
domain should only be used for purposes that promote the
public good within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment and
concluded that the power should never be used to advantage
139. Id. at 2676-77 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Brian W. Blaesser,
Eminent Domain for Private Gain? The Kelo v. City of New London Decision
and Aftermath, 57 PLAN. & ENVT'L L., No. 9, at 5 (A.P.A., Sept. 2005).
140. H.R. Res. 340, 109th Congress (2005).
141. Id.
806 [Vol: 46
KELO IN LAND USE LAW
one private party over any other private party. 142
The United States Senate has also been busy with its
own response to the Kelo decision. Senate Bill 1313 (Cornyn,
R-Tex.), with thirty co-sponsors, would declare economic
development to be an invalid public use under the federal
Constitution.13 The bill would also prohibit the use of federal
funds for any condemnation for economic development.
1 4
The bill remains in committee.
Similarly, legislation and proposed constitutional
amendments have been introduced in virtually every state to
address the perceived implications of the Kelo decision.
145
Twenty-two states have already passed legislation to restrict
the use of eminent domain; Alabama, Delaware, and Texas
were three of the first to do so. 146
The new Alabama law, which applies to current and
future eminent domain proceedings, prevents use of eminent
domain for economic development purposes except in blighted
areas. 47 In particular, the law prohibits municipalities and
counties from condemning property for (1) the purposes of
private retail, office, commercial, industrial, or residential
development, (2) primarily for enhancement of tax revenue,
or (3) for transfer to a person, nongovernment entity, public-
private partnership, corporation, or other business entity. 148
The law also gives the former owner of property condemned
for a lawful purpose, or his heirs or assigns, a right of first
refusal if the property is not used for the purpose for which it
was condemned or for some other public use. 49
The prohibition does not apply to the use of eminent
domain by a municipality, housing authority, or other public
entity based upon a finding of blight in an area specifically
covered by a redevelopment plan or urban renewal plan.'50
The law also does not limit the exercise of eminent domain by
142. Id.
143. S. 1313, 109th Cong. § 3 (2005).
144. Id.
145. See Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Eminent Domain: 2006 State
Legislation, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/natres/emindomainleg06.htm (last
visited Aug. 15, 2006) (hereinafter Nat'l Conference).
146. Nat'l Conference, supra note 145.
147. ALA. CODE §§ 11-47-170, 11-80-1 (2005).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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or for the benefit of public utilities or other entities engaged
in the generation, transmission, or distribution of utility
products or services.' 5 ' Nor does it prohibit a municipality or
county from using eminent domain to construct, maintain, or
operate streets and roadways, government buildings, or park
and recreation facilities.'52
Delaware's new eminent domain law provides that the
power may be used only for a recognized public use described
at least six months in advance of the condemnation. 1 3 The
description of the recognized public use must be provided in a
certified planning document, at a public hearing held
specifically to address the proposed condemnation, or in a
published report of the acquiring agency. 15 4
The Texas law, which amends various state statutes,
prohibits the use of eminent domain in certain contexts.'
Under the new law, use of eminent domain is prohibited
when the condemnation (1) confers a private benefit on a
particular private party through the use of the property, (2) is
for a public use that is merely a pretext to confer a private
benefit on a particular private party, or (3) is for economic
development purposes not related to the elimination of the
harmful effects of slums or blighted areas. 5 ' The law does
not apply to an array of uses, including transportation
projects, infrastructure projects, and public buildings.
Significantly, the law expressly excludes the use of eminent
domain for the Dallas Cowboys' proposed new football
stadium. 157
Legislation and constitutional amendments have been
proposed in other states to restrict the perceived implications
of the Kelo decision. 58  In addition, many communities
nationwide have adopted local ordinances denouncing the
decision and barring the use of eminent domain if it tends to
favor other private interests. 59
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 9505 (2006).
154. Id.
155. See TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2206.001 (LexisNexis 2006).
156. Id. § 2206.0001(b).
157. Id. § 2206.0001(c)(6).
158. See Nat'l Conference, supra note 145.
159. Castle Coal., Current Proposed Local Legislation on Eminent Domain,
http://www.castlecoalition.org/legislation/local/index.html (last visited Sept. 5,
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B. Kelo Fever in California
In California, one ballot initiative to severely restrict a
city's ability to take private property via eminent domain-
Proposition 90, the "Protect our Homes Act"-has qualified to
appear on the November 2006 ballot. 60 Proposition 90 would
apply to all public agencies in California, including cities,
with eminent domain authority.'61 Its proposed sweeping
changes include the following:
a "Public use" would be defined more narrowly than
public purpose and would be limited to projects
such as roads, parks and public facilities;
* "Public use" would require that the government
occupy the property or rent it out for public use;
a Use of eminent domain to transfer property from
one private party to another private party would
be prohibited (unless the private entity performs a
public use project);
* The amount of compensation to be paid for seized
property would be changed from fair market value
to the value of the property as the government
intends to use it;
* Property owners whose property is not taken but
who suffer "substantial economic loss" to their
property as a result of government action, such as
"down zoning," would be entitled to
compensation. 16
2
As a whole, these measures 163 would undermine state
and local governments' abilities to properly develop economic
plans through use of such successful techniques as urban
2006).
160. See Cal. Sec'y of State, Propositions that are on the November 7, 2006
General Election Ballot,
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/electionsj.htm#2006General (last visited Aug.
15, 2006).
161. Id.
162. Letter from Anita S. Anderson to the Honorable Bill Lockyer, Office of
the Attorney General (Dec. 13, 2005),
http://www.caag.state.ca.us/initiatives/pdf/sa2005rf0146.pdf (including text of
Proposition 90).
163. In addition, the Legislature is reviewing the State's Redevelopment Law
to consider imposing some restrictions. See League of Cal. Cities, Update on
Redevelopment Bills, http://www.cacities.org/index.jsp?displaytype=ll&zone=
locc&section=&subsec=&tert=&story=25338 (last visited Aug. 15, 2006).
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redevelopment, growth limits, infill development, and
inclusionary and affordable housing.
V. CONCLUSION: "MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING"
The Kelo Court's decision does not license legislative free
reign for the exercise of eminent domain on private property
across the country. The Court specifically mentions that a
determining factor in its decision was the "comprehensive
character of the plan" and the "thorough deliberation that
preceded [the plan's] adoption."164 The Court determined that
the plan and the thorough planning process ensured that the
project satisfied the Constitution's "public use" standard,
consistent with more than a century of case law.
Contrary to popular belief, use of the power of eminent
domain for the benefit of the community as a whole is not an
especially common method for development among cities. It
is instead one of many valuable tools planners and elected
officials use to create communities that serve the public
health, safety, and welfare. Moreover, the officials who
authorize eminent domain are generally subject to
accountability at the ballot box. For those reasons, eminent
domain does not give cities free reign on private property
rights. Rather, it serves as a useful tool, subject to both
legislative and judicial accountability, for facilitating
redevelopment and revitalization in communities where such
public benefits would not otherwise occur.
164. John R. Nolan & Jessica A. Bacher, Confirming a Century of Case Law,
N.Y.L.J. June 29, 2005 (citing Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2665
(2005)).
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